

## **SIERRA LEONE**

*by the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience (updated April 2018)*

### **Summary of Reparations Efforts and Programs**

Sierra Leone has a comprehensive transitional justice policy, including a hybrid court, truth commission, and reparations program, to address its internal armed conflict (1991–2002). Reparations have focused on service packages and symbolic measures. The reparations program has also included urgent interim payments and emergency rehabilitative surgeries.

### **Context**

Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict lasted from March 1991 until January 2002, killing approximately 70,000 people and displacing 2.6 million more, over half the population.<sup>1</sup> Rebel armed groups, namely the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), used violent tactics against civilians, including executions; amputations of limbs, lips, and ears; rape and sexual violence; the recruitment and use of child soldiers; and the destruction of towns and villages. On a smaller scale, government forces also committed serious crimes against civilians, such as the recruitment and use of child soldiers and sexual violence.<sup>2</sup>

The war ended with the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord between the government and the RUF on July 7, 1999.<sup>3</sup> The peace agreement committed the RUF to demobilize and disarm and controversially granted amnesty to all combatants. Importantly, the United Nations (UN) added a reservation to the peace agreement, stating that it does not recognize amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.<sup>4</sup> However, the peace agreement did not immediately stop hostilities and fighting between UN peacekeepers, which had been deployed to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and rebels continued until early 2001. The process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) concluded in January 2002, at which point 47,500 RUF combatants had disarmed.<sup>5</sup> On January 18, 2002, then-President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah declared the war was finally over.

### **Sources of Reparations**

Due to the destruction of Sierra Leone's social fabric after 11 years of war, citizens needed to come to terms with the past in order to heal and reconstruct communal relationships. To this end, the Lomé Peace Accord required the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).<sup>6</sup> The TRC Act of 2000 mandated the TRC to create an impartial historical record of conflict-related violations (from March 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999) and to promote healing, reconciliation, and non-repetition.<sup>7</sup>

The TRC began operating in 2002 and public hearings commenced in April 2003. The TRC submitted its final report in October 2004, which identified poor governance, corruption, and overwhelming executive powers as the root causes of the conflict. It found that most victims of rebel armed groups were men but that rebels also specifically targeted children for forced recruitment and women for rape and sexual slavery. The most common violations were killings, amputations, rapes, forced displacements, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detentions.<sup>8</sup> Drawing on domestic and international law, the TRC made specific recommendations to deliver urgently needed reparations to amputees, war-wounded, victims of rape and sexual violence, war widows, and children. In particular, it suggested the provision of healthcare, pensions, education, skills training, microcredit projects, and community and symbolic reparations.<sup>9</sup> The recommendations sought to address the root causes of the conflict by improving human rights protections, fighting corruption, reforming the justice and security sectors, and increasing the participation of youth and women in public life and democratic processes.<sup>10</sup>

The TRC recommendations were divided into four categories: “imperative,” “work towards,” “seriously consider,” and “calls on.” The government must implement “imperative” recommendations as soon as possible, and they require frequent and close follow up by the follow-up committee, an oversight body that facilitates execution. “Work towards” recommendations require the government to “put in place the building blocks to make the ultimate fulfilment of the recommendation possible” within a “reasonable time period,” and the follow-up committee must undertake ongoing monitoring of it. “Seriously consider” recommendations require the government only to “thoroughly evaluate the recommendation”—it does not have to implement it. There is no time constraint and the follow-up committee only needs to occasionally check progress. Finally, “calls on” recommendations target government entities outside the executive or legislative branches (such as the judiciary), non-governmental bodies, and members of the international community. “Calls on” recommendations are not legally binding.<sup>11</sup>

Although the TRC Act did not use the term “reparations,” it states that the TRC’s objectives are “to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.” The TRC’s final report indicated that its recommendations constituted Sierra Leone’s reparations program. The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which the government had established to deal with the war’s devastation, would implement this reparations program.<sup>12</sup>

The reparations program proposed by the TRC focused largely on victim rehabilitation through service packages and on symbolic reparations, such as satisfaction measures and guarantees of non-repetition, that acknowledge the past and harms suffered by victims. The TRC tried to be

careful not to exacerbate divisions between citizens in the same community, instead hoping to use reparations to unify the country.<sup>13</sup>

### **Reparations Efforts and Programs**

The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, directs states to provide victims with five forms of reparations: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.<sup>14</sup>

#### **1. Restitution**

Restitution aims to restore the victim to their situation before they had been violated. For example, enabling a victim's return to their place of residence, returning property, and restoring citizenship are acts of restitution.

##### *Restoration of employment*

The TRC proposed that the government assist organizations and other entities to deliver skills training programs for all amputees, war-wounded, victims of sexual violence, war widows, and children. Such programs would teach driving, soap-making, *gara* (tie-dyeing), tailoring, and computer technology for at least three to six months in order to better equip victim-beneficiaries for jobs.<sup>15</sup> The TRC recommended that all amputees and war-wounded whose earning capacities were more than halved because of their conflict-related injuries and victims of sexual violence retain the option of sending a relative to participate in this program on their behalf.<sup>16</sup>

In 2015, 1,004 victim-beneficiaries received interim cash grants, financial literacy training, and income generation training.<sup>17</sup>

##### *Return of property*

NaCSA, in collaboration with the government of Norway, built 888 houses in 14 districts to provide shelter for amputees, war-wounded, and victims of sexual violence.<sup>18</sup> The houses are equipped with water pumps that funnel safe drinking water to residents.

In addition, the TRC suggested that the government implement community reparations in areas where the war destroyed whole villages, considering the outcomes of different needs assessments in determining what infrastructure to initiate.<sup>19</sup> These recommendations have not been realized.

## 2. Compensation

When damage is economically assessable, states should provide compensation. Sierra Leone directly compensated victims in addition to funding health services. In 2009, the government launched the Victims' Trust Fund (VTF), in accordance with the Lomé Peace Accord and the TRC Act, to help fund material reparations. A database of war victims was established to keep track of delivered reparations.<sup>20</sup> As of December 2009, the reparations program has registered 55,000 victims but compensated only 29,733 with SLL 60,000 (approximately US\$8 as of 2018) per month.<sup>21</sup>

Despite a public awareness campaign, logistics hampered NaCSA's ability to reach all victims. For example, only limited information about registration was available in the remote areas of the country where most victims lived. By the time those victims received information, it was often too late for them to make the long trip to register. While there were mobile registration teams, sometimes they could not reach certain villages due to infrastructural problems.<sup>22</sup>

### *Physical or mental harm*

In 2009, the reparations program gave US\$100 interim payments each to 21,700 qualifying amputees, war-wounded, and victims of sexual violence.<sup>23</sup> In June 2012, NaCSA began a new round of cash payments to 10,753 victims of covered human rights violations, averaging approximately US\$80 per person.<sup>24</sup> In 2015, 2,622 war-wounded victims and other beneficiaries were medically evaluated to verify their eligibility for rehabilitation services and interim cash payments.<sup>25</sup>

## 3. Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation involves redressing victims through, for instance, the provision of medical, psychosocial, and legal services. Although NaCSA had started to implement healthcare and education programs, they remained stalled as of 2015 because of the diversion in resources toward handling the Ebola outbreak in 2013.

### *Medical and psychological care*

The TRC made recommendations to address urgent and long-term needs. In the short-term, the TRC suggested a range of free healthcare, surgery, and mental health measures for victim-beneficiaries.

In 2009, in keeping with a TRC recommendation to grant free healthcare for amputees, including surgery when necessary, NaCSA provided emergency surgeries for 31 amputees in Freetown.<sup>26</sup>

Relatedly, the TRC proposed physical healthcare that is free for the war-wounded to the degree required by their injuries.<sup>27</sup> As of 2011, amputees reported that the government offered free hospital beds but did not pay for expensive medication.<sup>28</sup>

For victims of sexual violence, the TRC recommended the institution of free healthcare and, when necessary, fistula surgery.<sup>29</sup> With the assistance of Mercy Ships International, NaCSA medically examined 235 victims of sexual violence to determine their level of need, referring a small number to Mercy Ships for surgery and others to Marie Stopes International for sexual and reproductive health services. Victims with less severe injuries received drug prescriptions. Finally, all victims participating in this process were given SLL 300,000 (approximately US\$100 at that time) to offset the costs of traveling to obtain treatment.<sup>30</sup>

Regarding psychological care, the TRC also recommended the provision of free psychosocial support and counseling for all victims. In the long-term, it suggested that the government establish a mental healthcare facility staffed with trained counselors and at least one psychiatrist in each district.<sup>31</sup> As of January 2017, the country has only one mental healthcare facility, instead of one for each of the 16 districts, and only two psychiatrists.<sup>32</sup>

#### *Legal and social services*

The TRC made a number of recommendations on education for victim-beneficiaries. The TRC proposed delivering free primary-level education to all children, noting the government's implementation of such free primary-level schooling in 2001.<sup>33</sup> It further suggested free secondary-level education for child victims and children of victims, prioritizing the education of adults with permanent disabilities and victims of sexual violence.<sup>34</sup> The Education Act of 2004 enshrines the right to basic education of all citizens and specifically names "amputees and other disabled persons" as individuals in need of this legal guarantee.<sup>35</sup>

To improve the quality of teachers, the TRC recommended that the government support teacher training programs.<sup>36</sup> However, as of 2014, approximately 40% of teachers were underqualified.<sup>37</sup>

#### **4. Satisfaction**

Satisfaction includes a wide range of measures, such as ceasefires, truth-seeking and documentation,<sup>38</sup> the search for missing or disappeared persons, and memorialization. Both the TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) have undertaken several measures to fulfill victims' right to satisfaction.

#### *Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth*

The TRC Act directed the TRC to create an impartial historical record of conflict-related violations from March 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999.<sup>39</sup> The TRC submitted its final report in October 2004.

#### *Search for the missing, disappeared, and killed*

The TRC recommended that the government identify mass graves and consult the families of missing or disappeared persons on what to do with mass graves.<sup>40</sup> As of April 2018, there has been no action taken on this.

#### *Public apology*

The TRC made an imperative recommendation that the President unequivocally apologize to women and girls on behalf of his government and preceding governments in Sierra Leone. On March 27, 2010, then-President Ernest Bai Koroma conveyed his regrets to women for the violations they experienced during the war and asked for their forgiveness.<sup>41</sup>

The TRC also suggested that other actors responsible for human rights violations publicly apologize.<sup>42</sup>

#### *Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations*

The war crippled the domestic justice system, so in 2000, the government requested assistance from the UN to establish a special court to prosecute serious wartime crimes against civilians and UN peacekeepers. The government and the UN negotiated the creation of the first hybrid judicial mechanism employing local and foreign staff, the SCSL, in Freetown.<sup>43</sup> It was the first international court funded by voluntary contributions as well as the first to complete its mandate and transition to a residual mechanism. Since March 2003, the SCSL indicted 13 individuals, convicting and sentencing the following 9 to terms ranging from 15 to 52 years:<sup>44</sup> Alex Tamba Brima, Santigie Borbor Kanu, and Brima Kamara of the AFRC; Allieu Kondewa and Moinina Fofana of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), a pro-government paramilitary force; Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao of the RUF; and Charles Taylor, who was indicted as the sitting President of Liberia and was the first head of state to be convicted since the Nuremberg trials. The SCSL had indicted four more individuals, but Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie of the RUF died before their judicial proceedings commenced, Samuel Hinga Norman of the CDF died during his trial, and former head of state Johnny Paul Koroma is at large.<sup>45</sup>

The SCSL completed its mandate in 2013 and transitioned to a residual mechanism, which is responsible for a variety of outstanding tasks, such as supervising prison sentences, handling appeals, and giving information to claimants seeking compensation in the domestic court system.

If Koroma is located, the residual mechanism has the power to try him or refer the case to the domestic court system for prosecution.<sup>46</sup>

#### *Commemorations and tributes to the victims*

In 2013, the SCSL and the government remodeled an SCSL building to house the Sierra Leone Peace Museum, which is a legacy project of the SCSL and a national memorial to honor victims, preserve truth, and promote sustainable peace. The Peace Museum contains a Memorial Garden to commemorate victims (per a TRC recommendation), an exhibit covering the history of the war and the peace process, and an archive of documents related to the conflict, including the public records of the SCSL and the TRC. In recognition of the difficulties faced by many in getting to Freetown, the Peace Museum has employed a mobile outreach team that travels around Sierra Leone, bringing special Peace Museum exhibitions to schools and communities in remote areas.<sup>47</sup>

### **5. Guarantees of non-repetition**

Guarantees of non-repetition center on institutional reform, such as vetting and lustration processes.

#### *Effective civilian control of military and security forces*

The TRC found that the security forces, namely the military and the police, failed the people of Sierra Leone during their time of need.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the TRC made proposals on ensuring the independence and impartiality of the security forces. For example, the TRC noted that members of the security forces must act with political neutrality, neither in favor nor against any political party.<sup>49</sup>

Since the publication of the TRC's final report in 2004, the government developed internal and external oversight mechanisms for the police. The Complaints, Discipline, and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID) is the police's internal mechanism and was created following pressure from international organizations. The CDIID can penalize police for their misconduct through dismissals, suspensions, reductions in rank, fines, eviction from the officer barracks, corrective trainings, reprimands, and warning letters, among other measures.<sup>50</sup> However, the CDIID has suffered from a lack of funding, training, and staff retention.

With support from UNDP, the government established the Independent Police Complaints Board (IPCB) to complement the CDIID's work. The IPCB began operating in 2015 as an independent body tasked with investigating allegations of police brutality and tracking trends in order to address systemic challenges faced by the police.<sup>51</sup> The IPCB presented its inaugural report to the

President in September 2017, and it remains to be seen how the independent board will continue to function.<sup>52</sup>

### *Due process, fairness, and impartiality in civilian and military proceedings*

The TRC suggested that the government initiate actions to ensure fair trials in an effort to check the President's ability to use emergency powers to overrule the legislature and judiciary, which wartime heads of state had exploited. For example, the TRC recommended that "all emergency measures must be subject to judicial review by the Courts of Sierra Leone."<sup>53</sup>

Various TRC recommendations concerned the need for legal representation for detainees making court appearances.<sup>54</sup> Following advocacy by civil society, Parliament passed the Legal Aid Act in 2012 and formed the Legal Aid Board, which aims to ensure fair trials and legal representation for individuals who cannot afford it. This will ideally help prevent arbitrary detention, on which the TRC made several imperative recommendations.<sup>55</sup> Although the board had opened regional offices throughout the country by August 2016,<sup>56</sup> many Sierra Leoneans remain unable to access the courts or retain legal representation.

In addition, the amended Local Courts Act of 2011 gives the judiciary direct oversight of the local courts, which were previously managed by the Ministry of Local Government.<sup>57</sup> It extends the rule of law to rural municipalities in an effort to establish and enhance local court operations and improve access to courts, lawyers, and judges. Yet a range of obstacles have prevented ordinary citizens from accessing justice, including socioeconomic challenges, geographical distances, cultural differences, language barriers, distrust in the justice agencies, and a general lack of knowledge about the law and the legal system.

### *Independence of the judiciary*

During the war, politicians made several politically motivated judicial appointments, which severely compromised the independence of the judiciary. In response to this problem, the TRC highlighted the importance of judicial reform to ensure the judiciary's ability to "dispense justice without fear or favor."<sup>58</sup> The TRC thus stated that the government should "work towards" creating a judiciary with financial and administrative autonomy.<sup>59</sup> However, the judiciary still lacks authority over its budget and conditions of service, making it difficult to reform this branch.

The TRC made an imperative recommendation to broaden representation on the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC), the body that appoints, dismisses, and disciplines judicial officers, by involving at least one law professor and three Members of Parliament, one of whom is in the opposition party.<sup>60</sup> The JLSC has needed reform in order to prevent governments from



abusing the JLSC's power to dismiss and discipline judicial officers, which wartime governments had done. As of March 2018, the members of the judiciary have continued to dominate the JLSC.<sup>61</sup>

Positively, Sierra Leone acted on an imperative TRC recommendation and adopted an enforceable code of conduct for judicial officials in September 2005.<sup>62</sup> Unfortunately, the code does not enumerate specific disciplinary actions for breaches, giving complete discretion to the judicial ethics committee. Additionally, punishments for breaches are not publicly available.<sup>63</sup>

Sierra Leone completed implementing the first and second generation Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment and is undertaking the execution of a third generation strategy for 2015–2018. As part of this effort, justice and law enforcement infrastructure has increased throughout the country, as seen in higher numbers of police stations, local courts, magistrate courts, and other supporting institutions like Local Police Partnership Boards.<sup>64</sup>

### *Vetting and lustration*

Many public officials, soldiers, and police committed or engaged in human rights violations and corruption during the war. Consequently, the TRC decided not to suggest lustration measures, which it believed would be practically unworkable and potentially divisive. In its final report, the TRC expressed concern that vetting and lustration processes would be abused for political ends or pursuing vendettas.<sup>65</sup>

Instead, Sierra Leone focused on removing corrupt public servants. The Anti-Corruption Act of 2008 strengthened the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), an independent agency. The Act importantly empowered the ACC to investigate and prosecute cases. Since its inception, the ACC has received over 400 complaints of judicial misconduct, including by judges, magistrates, and other senior personnel, and has investigated over 60 officials.<sup>66</sup> Despite some gains in preventing corruption, the ACC is not wholly independent because it is still subject to amendments and budget cuts by Parliament.

### *Protection of human rights defenders*

While Sierra Leone has made progress since the end of the war in 2002, human rights defenders have still reported threats and reprisals, particularly following the application of problematic legislation. For example, Sierra Leone continues to criminalize sedition and libel, despite an imperative TRC recommendation for the moratorium and repeal of such laws.<sup>67</sup> The government has used criminal defamation laws, namely the Public Order Act of 1965, to punish and silence journalists.<sup>68</sup> The Law Reform Commission has considered repealing criminal libel laws, but it has not made progress.<sup>69</sup>

Positively, the protection of informers and whistleblowers, as imperatively recommended by the TRC, is guaranteed under the Anti-Corruption Act.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, during the state's last Universal Periodic Review in January 2016, Sierra Leone accepted five recommendations on the protection of human rights defenders. In addition, the government has actively engaged with the International Service for Human Rights and their model law to protect human rights defenders while drafting domestic legislation to this end.<sup>71</sup>

#### *Human rights education and training for law enforcement officials and security forces*

The TRC did not specifically mention human rights education for security forces, but this is a particularly important issue in Sierra Leone where the police often prosecute cases because of the state's lack of judicial resources.<sup>72</sup>

#### *Mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their resolution*

In accordance with the Lomé Peace Accord and TRC recommendations, the government established the Human Rights Commission to monitor and deter future human rights violations and to follow up on TRC recommendations.<sup>73</sup> In November 2007, the UN and the Human Rights Commission urged the government to produce a strategy to finish implementing TRC proposals.

The Human Rights Commission also oversees the discharge of the government's international legal obligations and has the capacity to ensure that legal frameworks are followed at all times.<sup>74</sup> In 2011, the International Coordination Committee of National Human Rights Institutions in Geneva accredited the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone with an "A" status due to its full compliance with the Paris Principles, the international standards for national human rights institutions.<sup>75</sup>

However, the Human Rights Commission is severely underfunded and subject to budget cuts, late payment of staff salaries, and a lack of basic services, such as reliable electricity for its offices. This has adversely affected its ability to perform in accordance with its legislative mandate.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, the Ebola outbreak in 2013 delayed the Human Rights Commission's monitoring work.

#### *Review and reform of laws contributing to human rights violations*

The Constitution of 1991 was adopted in an autocratic environment with little input from the public, reflecting the bad governance identified by the TRC as a root cause of the conflict. Consequently, Sierra Leone has undertaken a constitutional review and reform process, in accordance with a TRC recommendation to adopt a new constitution following "a wide and

thorough consultative and participatory programme.”<sup>77</sup> In July 2013, the government created the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) to review and improve the Constitution of 1991 with respect to security sector reform, judicial reform, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and media development. The CRC was tasked with scrutinizing constitutional provisions flagged by the TRC and the Universal Periodic Review process. It comprised members of political parties, democratic institutions, civil society organizations, and the media. As part of this endeavor, the government promised to uphold equal opportunities and conditions for all citizens.

The CRC has carried out a series of activities, such as inclusive civic education, stakeholder consultations, consultative dialogues, workshops, and expert meetings on pressing national issues. The CRC presented its final 680-page report with 134 recommendations in January 2017. In November 2017, the government published its official response to the CRC’s report, rejecting 102 of the 134 recommendations. The government rejected all recommendations concerning the protection of human rights or the advancement of democratic principles.<sup>78</sup> The government’s rejection of three-quarters of the CRC recommendations, despite its extensive consultation process, may indicate the government’s unwillingness to reform the laws and culture that enabled the internal armed conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> Mary Kaldor with James Vincent, *Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries* (New York: UNDP Evaluation Office, 2006), 6, <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/conflict/SierraLeone.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Human Rights Watch, “The Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone,” April 11, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/armed-conflict-sierra-leone>.

<sup>3</sup> Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Lomé Peace Accord), July 7, 1999, [https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace\\_agreements/sierra\\_leone\\_07071999.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sierra_leone_07071999.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Sierra Leone,” in *World Report 2001* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/africa/sierraleone.html>.

<sup>5</sup> “Sierra Leone Leaders Declare War Over,” *PBS News Hour*, January 18, 2002, [https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/africa-jan-june02-sierra\\_01-18](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/africa-jan-june02-sierra_01-18); “Sierra Leone Profile – Timeline.”

<sup>6</sup> Lomé Peace Accord, arts. VI, XXVI.

<sup>7</sup> Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), “Executive Summary,” in *Witness to Truth: Final Report of the TRC*, vol. 2, chap. 1 (Accra: TRC, 2004), <http://www.sierraleonetr.com/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-chapter-one>.

<sup>8</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Findings,” in *Witness to Truth: Final Report of the TRC*, vol. 2, chap. 2 (Accra: TRC, 2004), <http://www.sierraleonetr.com/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-chapter-two>.

<sup>9</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” in *Witness to Truth: Final Report of the TRC*, vol. 2, chap. 4 (Accra: TRC, 2004), <http://www.sierraleonetr.com/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-chapter-four>.

<sup>10</sup> International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), *Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council 11th Session: May 2011* (New York: ICTJ, 2010), 2, [http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session11/SL/ICTJ\\_InternationalCentreTransitionalJustice-eng.pdf](http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session11/SL/ICTJ_InternationalCentreTransitionalJustice-eng.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Recommendations,” in *Witness to Truth: Final Report of the TRC*, vol. 2, chap. 3 (Accra: TRC, 2004), <http://www.sierraleonetr.com/index.php/view-report-text-vol-2/item/volume-two-chapter-three>.

<sup>12</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations.”

<sup>13</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶ 71.

<sup>14</sup> Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (December 16, 2005), available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx>.

- <sup>15</sup> Government of Sierra Leone National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), *Annual Report 2015* (Freetown: NaCSA, 2016), <http://www.nacsa.gov.sl/documents/NaCSA-Annual-Report-2015.pdf>.
- <sup>16</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶ 193.
- <sup>17</sup> NaCSA, *Annual Report 2015*, 15.
- <sup>18</sup> NaCSA, *Annual Report 2015*, 6.
- <sup>19</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶¶ 206–09.
- <sup>20</sup> International Organization for Migration, “Sierra Leone Victims Receive Compensation,” June 25, 2012, <https://www.iom.int/news/sierra-leone-victims-receive-compensation>.
- <sup>21</sup> Mohamad Suma and Cristián Correa, *Report and Proposals for the Implementation of Reparations in Sierra Leone* (New York: ICTJ, 2009), 9, <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-SierraLeone-Reparations-Report-2009-English.pdf>.
- <sup>22</sup> Suma and Correa, 6.
- <sup>23</sup> Suma and Correa, 7.
- <sup>24</sup> International Organization for Migration.
- <sup>25</sup> NaCSA, *Annual Report 2015*, 15.
- <sup>26</sup> Suma and Correa, 10.
- <sup>27</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶ 126.
- <sup>28</sup> Associated Press, “Those Maimed in Sierra Leone War Still Victims,” *NBC News*, April 5, 2006, [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12175226/ns/world\\_news-africa/t/those-maimed-sierra-leone-war-still-victims/#.Wsz5rS7wZ0w](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12175226/ns/world_news-africa/t/those-maimed-sierra-leone-war-still-victims/#.Wsz5rS7wZ0w).
- <sup>29</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶¶ 134–54.
- <sup>30</sup> Suma and Correa, 10.
- <sup>31</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶¶ 159–60.
- <sup>32</sup> Ryan Lenora Brown, “Ebola, War ... but Just Two Psychiatrists to Deal with a Nation’s Trauma,” *Guardian*, January 20, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/20/sierra-leone-war-ebola-africa-psychiatric-care>.
- <sup>33</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶¶ 173, 177.
- <sup>34</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶¶ 178, 182.
- <sup>35</sup> The Education Act (2004), art. 12, available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2004-2.pdf>.
- <sup>36</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶ 180.
- <sup>37</sup> “Sierra Leone News: Education for Girls, Children with Disabilities Is Fundamental,” *Awoko*, April 24, 2017, <https://awoko.org/2017/04/24/sierra-leone-news-education-for-girls-children-with-disabilities-is-fundamental/>.
- <sup>38</sup> Documentation involves the verification of the facts, which contributes to an accurate account of violations and the disclosure of the truth.
- <sup>39</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Executive Summary.”
- <sup>40</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Reparations,” ¶ 204.
- <sup>41</sup> ICTJ, “Sierra Leone: Apology to Women Victims a Welcome Step,” March 30, 2010, available at <http://www.peacewomen.org/content/sierra-leone-apology-women-victims-welcome-step>.
- <sup>42</sup> Sierra Leone TRC, “Recommendations,” ¶¶ 317–18, 518.
- <sup>43</sup> “The Special Court for Sierra Leone Its History and Jurisprudence,” Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, accessed April 17, 2018, <http://www.rscsl.org/>; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN–Sierra Leone, January 16, 2002, available at <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-agreement.pdf>.
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